ミッドウェイ 特別版 [DVD]
フォーマット | DVD-Video |
コントリビュータ | チャールトン・ヘストン, ヘンリー・フォンダ, ロバート・ミッチャム, 三船敏郎, ジャック・スマイト, ジェームズ・コバーン |
稼働時間 | 2 時間 6 分 |
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ユニバーサル 100周年
ユニバーサル シネマ・コレクション DVD
太平洋戦争の帰趨を決定した歴史的海戦の全貌を、豪華キャストで日米双方の視点から描いた戦争大作。
【キャスト】
チャールトン・ヘストン/ヘンリー・フォンダ/ジェームズ・コバーン/三船敏郎/ロバート・ミッチャム
【スタッフ】
監督:ジャック・スマイト
制作年:1976年
(C) 1976 UNIVERSAL STUDIOS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
※映像特典、商品仕様、ジャケット写真などは予告無く変更となる場合がございます。
登録情報
- メーカーにより製造中止になりました : いいえ
- 製品サイズ : 30 x 10 x 20 cm; 83.16 g
- EAN : 4988102052799
- 監督 : ジャック・スマイト
- メディア形式 : DVD-Video
- 時間 : 2 時間 6 分
- 発売日 : 2012/4/13
- 出演 : チャールトン・ヘストン, ヘンリー・フォンダ, ジェームズ・コバーン, 三船敏郎, ロバート・ミッチャム
- 販売元 : ジェネオン・ユニバーサル
- ASIN : B006QJSHBS
- ディスク枚数 : 1
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 170,554位DVD (DVDの売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- - 1,361位外国の戦争映画
- - 13,205位外国のアクション映画
- - 17,106位外国のドラマ映画
- カスタマーレビュー:
-
トップレビュー
上位レビュー、対象国: 日本
レビューのフィルタリング中に問題が発生しました。後でもう一度試してください。
2024年1月30日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
話自体は良くまとまってると思う
日本側も単なるヤラレ役という訳ではなくちゃんと華をもたせてる感じはする
後半の戦闘シーンがほとんど記録映像や他の映画の使い回しのなのが残念
日本側も単なるヤラレ役という訳ではなくちゃんと華をもたせてる感じはする
後半の戦闘シーンがほとんど記録映像や他の映画の使い回しのなのが残念
2022年1月8日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
半年後に転換期❗️流れとは、急でした。
過去30年くらい前に、映画館で見た❗️
あの頃は、軍艦が好きで見た❗️けれど、大人になって見ると、テロップで日本艦名は表示されるけど、、、模型以外は、アメリカの軍艦でした。おお笑いです😫💦
世の中に対応するには、空母を持って断固たる態度を示して欲しいですね💦
過去30年くらい前に、映画館で見た❗️
あの頃は、軍艦が好きで見た❗️けれど、大人になって見ると、テロップで日本艦名は表示されるけど、、、模型以外は、アメリカの軍艦でした。おお笑いです😫💦
世の中に対応するには、空母を持って断固たる態度を示して欲しいですね💦
2020年9月24日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
とても楽しめました。
昔の洋画も素晴らしいですが、最新の洋画も
追加料金を払っても見たいので、もっと、
増やしてほしいと思います。
昔の洋画も素晴らしいですが、最新の洋画も
追加料金を払っても見たいので、もっと、
増やしてほしいと思います。
2021年1月18日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
良かったです‼️
2019年12月4日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
正しい歴史を学べて、改めてアメリカの凄さを感じました。
他の国からのトップレビュー

Pedro from Santander (Spain)
5つ星のうち5.0
Versión BluRay en español con extras.
2022年12月22日にスペインでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Buena imagen, versión en inglés y en castellano con doblaje original de mediados de los 70, tal y como se estrenó en cine en España. El disco viene con unos 60 minutos de extras en total, con 5 pequeños documentales en inglés., en calidad DVD. El metraje total de la película es de 131 minutos en esta versión, con unos minutos más de escenas eliminadas que están dentro de los extras.

Narelle Falkenhagen
5つ星のうち5.0
Excellent
2021年2月22日にオーストラリアでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Liked the movie

Joshua Casey
5つ星のうち5.0
AWESOME!!
2011年6月17日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
I am a die-hard WWII fan and I LOOVE this movie! It is definately one of the most accurate WWII movies that Holywood ever created. As far as history goes; it's pretty much "to the letter." The Battle of Midway (Japanese: ¥ß¥Ã¥É¥¦¥§©`º£`é) is widely regarded as the most important naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II.[5][6][7] Between 4 and 7 June 1942, approximately one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea and six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy decisively defeated an Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) attack against Midway Atoll, inflicting irreparable damage on the Japanese fleet.[8] Military historian John Keegan has called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare."[9]
The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War.[10]
The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' aircraft carriers into a trap.[11] The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle Raid. This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa.
The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions.[12] Most significantly, American codebreakers were able to determine the date and location of the attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to set up an ambush of its own. Four Japanese aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser were sunk for a cost of one American aircraft carrier and a destroyer. After Midway, and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's shipbuilding and pilot training programs were unable to keep pace in replacing their losses while the U.S. steadily increased its output in both areas.[13]
Japan had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia); the latter, with its vital resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, there were strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, and infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, such that a follow-up strategy was not formulated until April 1942.[14] Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle by using a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his operational concept of further operations in the Central Pacific was accepted ahead of other competing plans.
Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he perceived as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign.[nb 1] This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid (18 April 1942) in which USAAF B-25 Mitchells launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe psychological shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands.[16][nb 2] This and other successful "hit and run" raids by American carriers, showed that they were still a threat although, seemingly, reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle.[17] Yamamoto reasoned that another attack on the main U.S base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet out to fight, including the carriers; however, given the strength of American land-based air power on Hawaii, he judged that Pearl Harbor could no longer be attacked directly.[18] Instead, he selected Midway, at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, some 1,300 mi (1,100 nmi; 2,100 km) from Oahu. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.[19] The U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 mi (1,900 km). An airstrip on Midway served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.
Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan was exceedingly complex.[21] Additionally, his design was predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the time. At the Battle of the Coral Sea just a month earlier, USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown damaged severely enough that the Japanese believed it also to have been sunk. The Japanese were also aware that USS Saratoga was undergoing repairs on the West Coast after suffering torpedo damage from a submarine.
However, more important was Yamamoto's belief the Americans had been demoralized by their frequent defeats during the preceding six months. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers would trail Vice-Admiral Nagumo Ch¨±ichi's carrier striking force by several hundred miles. Japan's heavy surface forces were intended to destroy whatever part of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's relief, once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel;[23] this was typical of the battle doctrine of most major navies.[24]
Yamamoto did not know that the U.S. had broken the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans). Yamamoto's emphasis on dispersal also meant that none of his formations could support each other. For instance, the only significant warships larger than destroyers that screened Nagumo's fleet were two battleships and three cruisers, despite his carriers being expected to carry out the strikes and bear the brunt of American counterattacks. By contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, and six cruisers, none of which would see any action at Midway. Their distance from Nagumo's carriers would also have grave implications during the battle, since the larger warships in Yamamoto and Kondo's forces carried scout planes, an invaluable reconnaissance capability denied to Nagumo
The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War.[10]
The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' aircraft carriers into a trap.[11] The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle Raid. This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa.
The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions.[12] Most significantly, American codebreakers were able to determine the date and location of the attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to set up an ambush of its own. Four Japanese aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser were sunk for a cost of one American aircraft carrier and a destroyer. After Midway, and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's shipbuilding and pilot training programs were unable to keep pace in replacing their losses while the U.S. steadily increased its output in both areas.[13]
Japan had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia); the latter, with its vital resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, there were strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, and infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, such that a follow-up strategy was not formulated until April 1942.[14] Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle by using a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his operational concept of further operations in the Central Pacific was accepted ahead of other competing plans.
Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he perceived as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign.[nb 1] This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid (18 April 1942) in which USAAF B-25 Mitchells launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe psychological shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands.[16][nb 2] This and other successful "hit and run" raids by American carriers, showed that they were still a threat although, seemingly, reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle.[17] Yamamoto reasoned that another attack on the main U.S base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet out to fight, including the carriers; however, given the strength of American land-based air power on Hawaii, he judged that Pearl Harbor could no longer be attacked directly.[18] Instead, he selected Midway, at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, some 1,300 mi (1,100 nmi; 2,100 km) from Oahu. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.[19] The U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 mi (1,900 km). An airstrip on Midway served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.
Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan was exceedingly complex.[21] Additionally, his design was predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the time. At the Battle of the Coral Sea just a month earlier, USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown damaged severely enough that the Japanese believed it also to have been sunk. The Japanese were also aware that USS Saratoga was undergoing repairs on the West Coast after suffering torpedo damage from a submarine.
However, more important was Yamamoto's belief the Americans had been demoralized by their frequent defeats during the preceding six months. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers would trail Vice-Admiral Nagumo Ch¨±ichi's carrier striking force by several hundred miles. Japan's heavy surface forces were intended to destroy whatever part of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's relief, once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel;[23] this was typical of the battle doctrine of most major navies.[24]
Yamamoto did not know that the U.S. had broken the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans). Yamamoto's emphasis on dispersal also meant that none of his formations could support each other. For instance, the only significant warships larger than destroyers that screened Nagumo's fleet were two battleships and three cruisers, despite his carriers being expected to carry out the strikes and bear the brunt of American counterattacks. By contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, and six cruisers, none of which would see any action at Midway. Their distance from Nagumo's carriers would also have grave implications during the battle, since the larger warships in Yamamoto and Kondo's forces carried scout planes, an invaluable reconnaissance capability denied to Nagumo

Darth Maciek
5つ星のうち5.0
One of the best war films ever made, although harmed by the bad use of war footage
2012年3月28日に英国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Although fully aware of its weak spots, I give "Midway" full five stars, because I believe this is one of the best reconstructions of major battles in history of cinema, the others being "Tora, Tora, Tora", "The longest day" and "Waterloo".
I agree with most of the negative comments on the war footage used in this film, with the presence of at least one jet plane from Korea War in one scene being possibly the most damning. Wildcats magically transforming into Hellcats and SBDs turning into Avengers in the blink of an eye are also quite annoying! Many of the fighting sequences could and should have been much better done and the use of some footage from "Tora, Tora, Tora" should have been avoided. However, except if you are really good at recognizing WWII warbirds, those points are finally not so important, as the focus of the film is to show all the major (and sometimes minor) decisions which affected the outcome of this fight and which made Midway such a unique and dramatic battle. And as far as this aspect is concerned, the film is a great success!
It begins already with the enormous error committed by Yamamoto when planning the whole operation; we realize it in the scene in which admiral Hosogaya says "This time the god of battles conceived a monster". This criticism is officially adressed to the junior officer who presents the plan - but in fact it is (by Japanese standards) an extremely direct attack against Yamamoto himself. But with admirals Nagumo and Yamaguchi remaining silent during the discussion, the plan remains unchanged; and for that reason, out of SEVEN carriers available, Nagumo will have only four with him at Midway to fight against three American ships... The absence of "Junyo", "Ryujo" and "Zuiho", send stupidly after secondary targets or affected to escort the transports, will cost the Japanese dearly... The scene continues with Admiral Yamaguchi raising another, even more important objection - what if Japanese carriers are forced to fight in the same time land based planes from Midway and carrier based planes of US Navy? This possibility is not given as much attention as it should - and the result is that this is exactly what will happen!
I will not of course describe here all the twists and turns, but one thing is clear - this film shows almost perfectly how the whole situation evolved and how finally the side which committed less mistakes (and which was also just a tiny little bit more lucky) carried the day. And it also pictures ADMIRABLY the proverbial "fog of war", when both sides are like boxers fighting blindfolded - with the first who manages to locate the enemy obtaining a great advantage...
The second reason why I give to this film five stars, is the casting. It is simply a constellation of great stars of world cinema, and they all do a hell of a job! Let's just enumerate some:
- Henry Fonda, as Admiral Nimitz
- Robert Mitchum, as Admiral Halsey
- Glenn Ford, as Admiral Spruance
- Toshiro Mifune, as Admiral Yamamoto
- Charlton Heston, as Captain Matt Garth (one of the very few fictional characters in the film)
And then there are also James Coburn, Robert Wagner, Joseph Shigeta (remember him from "Die Hard"?) as Admiral Nagumo, Cliff Robertson, Hal Holbrook and Erik Estrada in lesser roles. And let's not forget Tom Selleck in one of his first appearances on the screen...
I was particularly impressed by Henry Fonda's performance as Nimitz - his olympic calm and dignity and also a deep wisdom permit to understand why this admiral was such a great leader of men. James Shigeta is even better in his role of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, a man send to fight a battle much tougher than his superiors (and himself) expected and who is under an incredible, regularly increasing pressure...
As for the inaccuracies, most of them are rather imperceptible except for people who really know the details of this battle - like for example the planes from USS "Yorktown" attacking "Kaga", when in the real battle they attacked "Soryu"... But there is also ONE very very big blunder concerning Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, Japanese leader in two out of three attacks launched during this battle. Although taking off to the second attack with a damaged plane which couldn't make it back home (and thus knowing that he would die or be captured), Tomonaga absolutely did NOT launch his plane against USS "Yorktown"! Also, he was 30 years old in June 1942, but in this film, he is played by an actor who looks easily like pushing 45...
It is also true, that there was a TV version of this film, which was longer, with the battle of Coral Sea briefly covered and an extra love story added. But frankly, I believe that the cinema version, with the wonderfully filmed Doolittle's Raid as the beginning and with only limited time devoted to private life, is actually better. I regret however that in the film there is no mention of the ultimate fate of USS "Yorktown" (a short conversation of 30 seconds would be enough) and of the final (and in my opinion very stupid) decision made by Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi towards the end of the battle.
Last but not least - in the film it is stressed, that at Midway Americans were outnumbered. Well, that is FALSE! Certainly, the Japanese had four carriers ("Kaga", "Akagi", "Hiryu" and "Soryu") against three for Americans (USS "Enterprise", USS "Hornet", USS "Yorktown") but counting the planes, Americans had the numbers for them: 233 carrier based planes + 127 planes from Midway = 360 planes as opposed to Japanese 248 carrier based planes. In fact, Midway was decided at least partly because in planes Americans OUTNUMBERED the Japanese 3:2.
But, bottom line, weaker points notwithstanding I still consider "Midway" as one of the greatest war films ever made, because of an excellent, very dramatic, very clear and very complete description of all the key moments of this unique and incredible battle. I watched it many times and I never got bored - even for one minute! Enjoy!
I agree with most of the negative comments on the war footage used in this film, with the presence of at least one jet plane from Korea War in one scene being possibly the most damning. Wildcats magically transforming into Hellcats and SBDs turning into Avengers in the blink of an eye are also quite annoying! Many of the fighting sequences could and should have been much better done and the use of some footage from "Tora, Tora, Tora" should have been avoided. However, except if you are really good at recognizing WWII warbirds, those points are finally not so important, as the focus of the film is to show all the major (and sometimes minor) decisions which affected the outcome of this fight and which made Midway such a unique and dramatic battle. And as far as this aspect is concerned, the film is a great success!
It begins already with the enormous error committed by Yamamoto when planning the whole operation; we realize it in the scene in which admiral Hosogaya says "This time the god of battles conceived a monster". This criticism is officially adressed to the junior officer who presents the plan - but in fact it is (by Japanese standards) an extremely direct attack against Yamamoto himself. But with admirals Nagumo and Yamaguchi remaining silent during the discussion, the plan remains unchanged; and for that reason, out of SEVEN carriers available, Nagumo will have only four with him at Midway to fight against three American ships... The absence of "Junyo", "Ryujo" and "Zuiho", send stupidly after secondary targets or affected to escort the transports, will cost the Japanese dearly... The scene continues with Admiral Yamaguchi raising another, even more important objection - what if Japanese carriers are forced to fight in the same time land based planes from Midway and carrier based planes of US Navy? This possibility is not given as much attention as it should - and the result is that this is exactly what will happen!
I will not of course describe here all the twists and turns, but one thing is clear - this film shows almost perfectly how the whole situation evolved and how finally the side which committed less mistakes (and which was also just a tiny little bit more lucky) carried the day. And it also pictures ADMIRABLY the proverbial "fog of war", when both sides are like boxers fighting blindfolded - with the first who manages to locate the enemy obtaining a great advantage...
The second reason why I give to this film five stars, is the casting. It is simply a constellation of great stars of world cinema, and they all do a hell of a job! Let's just enumerate some:
- Henry Fonda, as Admiral Nimitz
- Robert Mitchum, as Admiral Halsey
- Glenn Ford, as Admiral Spruance
- Toshiro Mifune, as Admiral Yamamoto
- Charlton Heston, as Captain Matt Garth (one of the very few fictional characters in the film)
And then there are also James Coburn, Robert Wagner, Joseph Shigeta (remember him from "Die Hard"?) as Admiral Nagumo, Cliff Robertson, Hal Holbrook and Erik Estrada in lesser roles. And let's not forget Tom Selleck in one of his first appearances on the screen...
I was particularly impressed by Henry Fonda's performance as Nimitz - his olympic calm and dignity and also a deep wisdom permit to understand why this admiral was such a great leader of men. James Shigeta is even better in his role of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, a man send to fight a battle much tougher than his superiors (and himself) expected and who is under an incredible, regularly increasing pressure...
As for the inaccuracies, most of them are rather imperceptible except for people who really know the details of this battle - like for example the planes from USS "Yorktown" attacking "Kaga", when in the real battle they attacked "Soryu"... But there is also ONE very very big blunder concerning Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, Japanese leader in two out of three attacks launched during this battle. Although taking off to the second attack with a damaged plane which couldn't make it back home (and thus knowing that he would die or be captured), Tomonaga absolutely did NOT launch his plane against USS "Yorktown"! Also, he was 30 years old in June 1942, but in this film, he is played by an actor who looks easily like pushing 45...
It is also true, that there was a TV version of this film, which was longer, with the battle of Coral Sea briefly covered and an extra love story added. But frankly, I believe that the cinema version, with the wonderfully filmed Doolittle's Raid as the beginning and with only limited time devoted to private life, is actually better. I regret however that in the film there is no mention of the ultimate fate of USS "Yorktown" (a short conversation of 30 seconds would be enough) and of the final (and in my opinion very stupid) decision made by Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi towards the end of the battle.
Last but not least - in the film it is stressed, that at Midway Americans were outnumbered. Well, that is FALSE! Certainly, the Japanese had four carriers ("Kaga", "Akagi", "Hiryu" and "Soryu") against three for Americans (USS "Enterprise", USS "Hornet", USS "Yorktown") but counting the planes, Americans had the numbers for them: 233 carrier based planes + 127 planes from Midway = 360 planes as opposed to Japanese 248 carrier based planes. In fact, Midway was decided at least partly because in planes Americans OUTNUMBERED the Japanese 3:2.
But, bottom line, weaker points notwithstanding I still consider "Midway" as one of the greatest war films ever made, because of an excellent, very dramatic, very clear and very complete description of all the key moments of this unique and incredible battle. I watched it many times and I never got bored - even for one minute! Enjoy!

Gary L Bell
5つ星のうち5.0
Great portrayal of historical moments.
2024年3月24日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Excellent movie and actors


Gary L Bell
2024年3月24日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済み
このレビューの画像
